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CASE COMMENTS
counterclaim first was an abuse of discretion under Rule 4 2(b). That
is to say, Rule 4 2(b) neither requires nor permits the result reached
by the District Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals and the
dissent in the United States Supreme Court. It logically follows that
in the principal case, and like cases, the only possible way permissibly
to exercise discretion under Rule 4 2(b) would be to order jury trial
of the legal claim before court trial of the "equitable" claim, for the
reverse would constitute an abuse of discretion. Since discretion im-
plies a choice, and since in fact there is no choice in this type of case,
it is submitted that in effect there is no true discretion to be exercised
under 42(b) in the present case and like cases.
ROBERT L. GILLIAT, III
USEFUL LIFE, SALVAGE VALUE, AND THE
1954 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The terms "useful life" and "salvage value" have long been familiar
to accountants. When Congress enacted section 167 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,1 the groundwork was laid for hammering out
in the courts precise definitions of both of these terms, which must
first be ascertained before depreciation may be computed. Should these
terms have the same meaning in tax lhw as they have acquired in
accounting? And, if so, what do they mean to the accountant?
Depreciation, 2 an important expense in the financial affairs of
'Sec. 167. DEPRECIATION.
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depredation deduction a
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reason-
able allowance for obsolescence)-
(x) of property used in trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
(c) Limitations on Use of Certain Methods and Rates.-Paragraphs (a),
(3), and (4) of subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of property (other
than intangible property) described in subsection (a) with a useful life of 3
years or more-
(2) acquired after December 31, 1953, if the original use of such prop-
erty commences with the taxpayer and commences after such date." Int.
Rev. Code of 1954 § 167."
2Depreciation, therefore, is an annual expense which represents a systematic
and rational spreading of the cost of an asset over the period during which it pro-
duces income.
"The amount of allowance for depreciation is the sum which should be
set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end of the useful life of the
i960]
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modem business enterprises, is one of the principal means by which
the accountant matches costs with revenues. An inconsistency be-
tween the accounting and the legal definitions of the elements of de-
preciation will lead to litigation because the accountant seeks to re-
port actual income, while the attorney seeks to safeguard for his
client the maximum allowed tax advantages.
The two phrases, "useful life" and "salvage value," are inseparably
intertwined because the definition of one will fix the meaning of the
other. For example, if useful life is found to be economic useful life,
i.e., the life inherent in the asset, salvage can be no more than scrap
value.3 Conversely, when salvage value is defined as scrap value, it
follows that useful life must mean economic useful life, for only upon
the expiration of the physical life of an asset has its value been re-
duced to scrap.
4
The problem involved grows out of the tax advantage gained by
using accelerated depreciation, an example of which is the declining-
balance method. 5 To illustrate, assume that a $io,ooo asset with a
ten-year economic useful life and no salvage value was acquired on
January i, 1954. The non-accelerated straight-line method gives a
io per cent rate, or $1,ooo depreciation expense per year. After four
years, or on December 31, 1957, the adjusted basis of the asset would
be $6,ooo ($1o,ooo-$4,ooo). On the other hand, under the declining-
balance method a 20 per cent rate can be used which will result in
depreciation expense of $2,000 in 1954, $i,6oo in 1955, $1,28o in
1956, and $1,024 in 1957. The adjusted basis at the end of 1957
would be $4,o96. If on January 1, 1958, the taxpayer sells the asset
for $6,ooo, and he has used the straight-line method, he will have
neither gain nor loss. On the other hand, if the taxpayer had used
plant in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the salvage
value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original cost." United States v.
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927).
3For the purposes of this comment, scrap value is synonomous with junk value.
'7 Drake L. Rev. 40, 42-43 (957).
'In the declining-balance method of accelerated depreciation, the adjusted basis
of an asset is reduced by a constant percentage each accounting period, usually
one year. This method gives the greatest depreciation allowance in the first year
of the useful life of the property and a gradually smaller allowance in each suc-
cessive year. The amount of the depreciation allowance for each year is subtracted
from the basis of the property (without regard to salvage value), so that each
year the uniform depreciation rate is applied to a smaller, or declining-balance.
For taxable years after December 31, 1953, new assets having a useful life of three
years or more may be depreciated under the declining-balance method at twice
the straight-line rate. This practice is known as the double declining-balance. Treas.
Reg. § 1.16 7 (b)-2 (959)-
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the declining-balance method he would now have a capital gain of
$1,904 (the amount realized, $6,ooo, less the adjusted basis, $4,096).
The tax advantage from using the declining-balance method results
from the U1,904 gain being taxed as a capital gain at a rate not ex-
ceeding 25 per cent," even though the depreciation expense was al-
ready deducted from ordinary income during the period, 1954-1957.
If instead, the taxpayer chooses to retain that asset in his trade or
business his taxable income for the same period would be $1,904 less
under the declining-balance method than under the straight-line
method, resulting in deferral of the tax until later periods when the
depreciation would be less under the accelerated method than under
the straight-line method.
Only those assets with a "useful life" of three years or more may
be depreciated under the accelerated method.7 The question is, did
Congress intend that those who acquired long term assets with an
economic useful life of greater than three years but a useful life to the
taxpayer of less than three years be allowed the advantages described
above. In other words, does "useful life" in section 167 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code mean useful life to the taxpayer or useful
life inherent in the asset? To view the same problem from the
standpoint of salvage value, does "salvage value" mean the same thing
as scrap value, or does it denote any sum reasonably estimated to be
realizable upon the sale of a long term asset (i.e., a figure below which
an asset may not be depreciated.)?
A recent case which points out these problems is Hertz Corp. v.
United States.8 The plaintiff applied for a tax refund for the fiscal years
Olnt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (j), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 846 (1942), as
amended, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 5oo (1951) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231 (a)).
"If the gains to which section 1231 applies exceed the losses to which the sec-
tion applies, the gains and losses are... subject to the provisions of section 12oi
through 1212, relating to capital gains and losses." Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1 (b)(2)
(1959). Duval Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 42 (1957), aft'd, 264 F.2d 548 (5 th
Cir. 1959); Latimer-Looney Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commissioner, g T.C. 120 (1952).
This situation is not to be mistaken for one in which the taxpayer turns
over long term assets in such a way that doing so ceases to be an incident of his
regular business but becomes a steady and continuous source of recurrent income
to him. In such cases, the amount realized on the sale of those assets, which rep-
resents the difference between the adjusted basis and the selling price, is treated
as ordinary income.
7See statute cited note i supra.
8Hertz Corp. v. United States, 268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959), reversing 165 F. Supp.
261 (D. Del. 1958), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
See also Evans v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 502 (pth Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
361 U.S. 812 (1959); United States v. Massey Motors, Inc., 264 F.2d 552 (5 th Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 8io (1959).
i96o]
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ending March 31, 1954-1956, declaring that he was entitled to use the
declining-balance method of depreciation for automobiles used in his
car rental agency instead of the straight-line method he had used.9
It was conceded that automobiles used for public hire have an
economic useful life of four years,10 but the facts disclosed that the
plaintiff's actual holding period for automobiles used in his busi-
ness was 26.17 months during the years 1954-1956 and 29.36 months for
the nine year period 1946-1956. The court pointed out that in order to
clarify the meaning of "useful life" and "salvage value" the Secretary
of the Treasury issued Regulation section 1.167 (a)(i)(b) (1956)11
defining "useful life" as useful life to the taxpayer. The District Court
also ruled that "useful life"' 2 meant useful life to the taxpayer, but
held that the Hertz Corporation was entitled to the refund because
this regulation could not be retroactively applied, as it represented
an administrative change of a long-standing rule, both in the legal
and accounting professions. The same court concluded that salvage
value other than that inherent in the declining-balance method of
depreciation 3 is not a factor in determining depreciation. The Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court on both points. The court,
after examining (i) prior judicial interpretation, (2) administrative
practices, and (3) expert opinion, concluded that the disputed regu-
lation did not change previous custom-that "useful life" has always
meant useful life to the taxpayer. Salvage value was held to be a
factor in determining the depreciation expense under the declining-
balance method after the court examined Congressional intent based
upon the report of the House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee considering the bill14 before its passage.
In the Hertz case both the taxpayer and the Commissioner main-
tained that Congress did not intend to change the meaning of any
word or words which had a long-standing custom supporting their
use. The parties disagreed as to what the long-standing meaning
'The petitioner was the successor by merger to the J. Frank Connors concern
which had actually been the one to use the stright-line method. Therefore, the
Hertz Corporation is here maintaining that J. Frank Connors made a mistake
which Hertz may correct.
1IOnt. Rev. Serv. Publication No. 173 (1955), 2 CCH 1959 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
paragraph 1777.289.
=See text p. io8 infra.
32165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958).
"The declining-balance method of depreciation always leaves an undepreciated
amount of the original basis because a constant percentage is applied to a positive
figure before subtracting that per cent of the figure from the whole positive figure.
1'H.R. Rep. No. 1337 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954); 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News,
83d Cong. 2d Sess. 4049 (1954).
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really was. If the taxpayer's contention that "useful life" had previous-
ly meant economic useful life was correct, a finding that the pertinent
regulation 5 was in accord with Congressional intent would preclude
the Commissioner from denying the taxpayer the declining-balance
method of depreciation.' 6 In examining previous judicial interpreta-
tion the court justifiably placed little emphasis upon the cases that
used the terms "useful life" and "salvage value" since those cases did
not attempt to define the terms.17 Although trends are discernible, no
definite pattern can be ascertained from a close reading of the cases.' 8
Especially to be noted is Evans v. Commissioner,9 wherein the Court
"Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(1)(b) and (c) (1956).
" When an interpretative regulation [Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(l)(1956)] has
become well entrenched from long-continued general acceptance, and when its
underlying statute is reenacted by Congress without change, (Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 167) the taxpayer has a right to rely on such interpretation. If changes are
made through administrative channels, [Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (1957)] such changes
may not be applied retroactively. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S.
110, 117 (1939); Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953); Shearer v. An-
derson, 16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927); St. Louis Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 411
(D. Del. 1955); United Fruit Co. v. Hassett, 61 F. Supp. 1oi3 (D. Mass. 1945). See
also Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398, 411
(1941).
2-Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958); Goldberg v. Commissioner,
239 F.2d 316 (5 th Cir. 1956); Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d
Cir. 1956); Yellow Cab Co. v. Driscoll, 24 F. Supp. 993 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Warren H.
Brown, 27 T.C. 27 (1956); Dorothy Caruso, 23 T.C. 836 (1955); Wier Long Leaf
Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990 (1947), aff'd and rev'd other grounds, 173 F.2d 549 (5 th Cir.
1949); Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935); American Refrigerator Transit
Co., 31 B.T.A. 465 (1934); John A. Maguire Estate Ltd., 17 B.T.A. 394 (1929); San-
ford Cotton Mills, 14 B.T.A. 1210 (1929); Wallace G. Kay, io B.T.A. 534 0928); Max
Curtz, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927); Whitman-Douglas Co., 8 B.T.A. 694 (1927); Merkle
Broom Co., 3 B.T.A. 1084 (1926); J. R. James, 2 B.T.A. 1071 (1925); West Va. &
Pa. Coal & Coke Co., 1 B.T.A. 790 (1925); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., P-H Tax Ct.
Meme. 818 (1956); Otis Beall Kent, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 53 (1954); Nat Lewis, 23
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1064 (1954); Transoceanic Terminal Corp., 23 P-H Tax Ct
Mere. 270 (1954); L. A. Davidson, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 983 (1953); Louis E. Whit-
ham, 2o P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 232 (1951); W. H. Norris Lumber Co., 17 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 651 (1948); Universal Mills, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1948); The Bolta
Co., 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1945); W. N. Foster, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1167
(1943); General Securities Co., it P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 219 (1942).
1it is interesting to note, however, that only in the cases decided in the late
194o's which referred to the 1939 Internal Revenue Code and the cases arising
under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code do the concepts of "useful life" and "salvage
value" begin to shift ground and uphold the contentions of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
2264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 561 U.S. 812 (1959). Here the
petitioner was in the business of leasing automobiles to Evans UrDrive, Inc. which
in turn leased automobiles to the public on long and short term leases. During
the taxable years, 195G-51, the petitioner depreciated the automobiles used for his
business assuming a four year useful life and no salvage value. In those years he
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit reached a conclusion favorable to
the taxpayer when faced with the same questions as the Hertz case.
On the other hand, in United States v. Massey Motors, Inc.20 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concurred with the principal case.
21
The second ground upon which the court based its conclusion
that the regulation did not announce definitions contrary to well-
entrenched practices was the previous administrative policy. It appears
that there was a difference of opinion between the court and the tax-
payer regarding whose contention the Treasury Department's Bulletin
F (the publication used as a guide to ascertain the generally accepted
useful life of property used for trade or business) supported in de-
termining whether the new regulations were contrary to established
administrative policy. The court appears to have relied strongly on
Bulletin F, while admitting its ambiguity. Even though the Internal
sold 14o and 147 automobiles respectively resulting, on the average, in the follow-
ing advantage for each automobile:
YEAR COST DEPRECArION CLAIMED SELLING PRICE GAIN
(straight-line method) (taxed at 25
Per cent rate)
1950 $1,650 $515 $1,380 $245
1951 $1,495 $450 $1,395 $350
The court reached the conclusion that "useful life" meant useful life in-
herent in the asset and that scrap value as a factor in determining depreciation
should be the estimated proceeds which might be realized upon the sale or other
disposition of the asset at the end of that inherent useful life. Since the petitioner
took no salvage value into account, the case was remanded to the Tax Court for
a determination of the salvage value.
Thus, even before the accelerated depreciation methods were introduced, a
considerable tax gain could be realized by using the conventional straight-line
method if the taxpayer were to interpret "useful life" as being useful life inherent
in the asset and "salvage value" as being scrap value.
21264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 81o (1959). Appellee was
a franchised ,Chrysler dealer in Jacksonville, Florida, who periodically withdrew
automobiles from his regular stock. Half of these automobiles he assigned to his
employees and executives. The other half he rented to an independent company.
Regularly on the preset schdule, appellee sold all of the vehicles taken from his
stock. This sale resulted in a substantial profit. In addition he depreciated those
automobiles taking into account no salvage value. The gains on the sales were
reported as capital gains. The Court of Appeals disallowed such treatment. "The
thrust of its position is that depreciation must be figured with relation to the
known useful life of the asset in the hands of the taxpayer rather than the entire
useful life of the property itself; that depreciation can not be figured without con-
sidering the salvage value at the end of the useful life in the hands of the tax-
payer; that it was demonstrated here that the useful life in the hands of Massey
Motors, Inc. was less than a year; and that the salvage value more than equaled
original cost; thus the depreciation would be zero." Id. at 554.
-1268 F.2d 604.
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Revenue Service 22 announced that the Bulletin was not authoritative,
it was republished in a more up-to-date fashion in 1942, adding:
"It contains information and statistical data relating to the
determination of deductions for depreciation and obsolescence,
from which taxpayers and their counsel may obtain the best
available indication of Bureau practice and the trend and
tendency of official opinion in the administration of pertinent
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding
or similar provisions of prior Revenue Acts. (Emphasis added)."
The ambiguous section in the newer edition of Bulletin F is as follows:
"The proper allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear, includ-
ing obsolescence of property used in trade or business is that
amount which should be set aside for the taxable year in ac-
cordance with a reasonably consistent plan (not necessarily at
a uniform rate) whereby the aggregate of the amounts so set
aside, plus salvage value, will, at the end of the useful life of
the property, in the business, equal the cost or other basis of the
property. (Emphasis added).
'23
Until June, 1956, the administrative policy remained unchanged.
section 167 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code does not define either
useful life or salvage vale.24 The direct predecessor of Treasury Reg-
ulation section 1.167 was a proposed regulation published in the
Federal Register in 195425 which used the same phraseology as Treas-
ury Regulation section 11826 interpreting the 1939 Code. Although
never promulgated, the proposed regulation shows the administrative
thinking of the times.
The first indication of a change to a more definite statement of
policy is found in a letter from Laurens Williams, Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury, to Representative Thomas B. Curtis of
Missouri, which appeared in the Congressional Record on June 16,
1955.2- The correspondence stressed the need for a "realistic salvage
value" and illustrates that the administrative wind was shifting and
that a change in policy was likely.
"[U]seful life used in determining depreciation allowance is
not the full,normally inherent useful life of the property. It is,
rather, the useful life of the property determined in accordance
-his agency was formerly designated as the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
:268 F.2d at 6o8.
2
-See note i supra.
2Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.167,, 19 Fed. Reg. 6229 (1954).
-oTreas. Reg. x18, § 39.23(1)-1 (1953).
"'ioi Cong. Rec. 8570 (1955)-
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with the practice of the particular taxpayer in his trade or
business or in the production of income."
On June 11, 1956, less than one year after this letter, the Treasury
Department issued Treasury Regulation section 1.167 (a)(i)(b) and (c):
"For the purpose of section 167 the estimated useful life of an
asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but
is the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected
to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the
production of his income.... Salvage value is the amount (de-
termined at the time of acquisition) which is estimated will be
realizable upon the sale or other disposition of an asset when it
is no longer useful to the taxpayer.... If the taxpayer's policy
is to dispose of assets which are still in good operating condi-
tion, the salvage value may represent a relatively large por-
tion of the original basis of the asset."
There appears to be little doubt that the Treasury Department's
interpretative regulation was appropriate. 28 While the Secretary of
the Treasury is under no legal obligation to conform his definitions
of accounting terms to the meanings generally accepted by the ac-
counting profession, his policy has been to issue regulations that are
not entirely dissimilar in their definitions.
The last proposition which the court examined when ruling upon
the Hertz case was the expert opinion relied upon by the taxpayer.
The Hertz Corporation produced representatives of three of the lead-
ing accounting firms, Price Waterhouse & Co., Ernst & Ernst, and
Arthur Andersen & Co., who testified that the long-standing custom
of the accounting profession supported the taxpayer's contention.
Those' witnesses represented three of the most reputable accounting
firms in the country. On the other hand, the court noted only a
single treatise to the contrary, which was edited by the partners of
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery.29 It is difficult to conceive of
more competent sources than the taxpayer's witnesses to state exactly
what the accounting customs are; yet the court pursued the matter
of expert testimony no further than mentioning that there was a
difference of opinion when it should have relied more heavily upon
the taxpayer's authorities.
"The defining of "useful life" and "salvage value" is analogous to the situa-
tion which arose in connection with the use of the words "reasonable allowance"
in the Revenue Act of 1918 in which it was held that the terms used by Congress
were ambiguous enough to warrant administrative clarification. Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3o6 U.S. 11o (1939); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935); Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920).
"Montgomery's Federal Taxes ch. 6 (37th ed. 1958).
80268 F.2d at 6og.
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Near the end of the opinion,30 the court briefly stated that "salvage
value" as used in the 195 4 Code section dealing with the mechanics
of the declining-balance method of depreciation did not support the
plaintiff's contention that it was not a factor in determining the de-
preciation expense calculated by that method. This is just another
way to assert that "useful life" means useful life to the taxpayer.3'
Supporting this view the court quoted from the House of Represen-
tatives committee report on the bill before its passage: 32 "The changes
made by your committee's bill merely affect the timing and not the
ultimate amount of depreciation deductions with respect to a prop-
erty."33 However, the court failed to point out that the Senate Finance
Committee's report clearly shows that the committee was fully cogni-
zant of the capital gains tax advantage to be derived from the use of
the declining-balance method of depreciation, which was so strongly
contended for by the taxpayer.
"The liberalized declining-balance method included in the
bill concentrated deductions in the early years of service and
results in a timing of allowance more in accord with the actual
pattern of loss of economic usefulness. With the rate limited
to twice the corresponding straight-line rate based on-a realis-
tic estimate of useful life, the proposed system conforms to
sound accounting principles....
The use of the 2oo-percent declining-balance rate in the
case of short lived properties would result in extremely fast
writeoffs.... These properties would retain substantial value
and could be resold subject to capital gain rates."3 4
The conflicting committee reports indicate that the true intent
of Congress regarding depreciation, a concept which involves salvage
value as well as useful life, is ambiguous. It, therefore, seems that the
issue regarding salvage value could" better have been handled by
considering it along with useful life. There is no controversy as to the
definition of "salvage value" as there is in the case of "useful life",
but it seems that Congress intentionally omitted the requirement
""The question concerning the proper application of salvage value to the
declining-balance method of depreciation need not detain us for long." Ibid. This
statement is indicative of the abbreviated treatment the issue concerning salvage
value received in the course of the opinion.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 3 (1954); a6 U.S.C. (1958)-
2See note 14 supra.
s'S. Rep. No. 1622 83 d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 29 (1954); 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 4656, 4659 (1954) (Emphasis added.)
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231 (a).
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that such value be taken into account as a factor in calculating the
depreciation expense under the particular method in question.
If Congress had intended for salvage value to have a particular
meaning or for it to be considered at all, it would have indicated its
intention in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
The Treasury Department's regulation was designed to deny capi-
tal gains treatment for gains resulting from the frequent sale of de-
preciable property used in trade or business.3 5 This apparent ad-
ministrative change in attitude is understandable, as there was an
increasing trend to turn over long term assets in a period of high
resale values. Since this practice was costing the government con-
siderable revenues, the question arises whether the court was not in-
fluenced more by the obvious policy to close the loophole than by
the affirmative evidence of the customary usage. W¥hen viewed in the
light of the surrounding circumstances, the ruling of the circuit court
in the Hertz case may have considerable merit, but from the considera-
tion of the evidence produced the holding might well have been par-
tially or even totally opposite.
When courts are asked to define accounting terms and then make
a decision contrary to previous understandings of the accountants, the
members of the accounting profession are then faced with two alterna-
tives, neither of which is desirable. They may accept the new definition
which would result in an inaccuracy, according to accounting prin-
ciples, in the financial statements which they issue or may, as many
larger firms require, keep two sets of records, one for taxation pur-
poses and a more precise set for management.36 The latter course is
usually too expensive for the average sized firm.
There is, therefore, much to be said supporting the position which
the accountant must maintain in his insistence that income be ascer-
tained through the use of tenets and principles which have evolved
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1221, 1231. The 'rreasury Department was attacking
the loophole on three fronts which "were basically as follows: (1) asserting that
the assets sold by [the] taxpayer were items of inventory, and therefore not
qualified for capital gain treatment under section 1a231; (2) seeking to readjust
useful life and salvage value.., so as to reduce the depreciation rate per annum
or by increasing salvage so as to reduce the amount of depreciation allowable;
or (3) asserting that "useful life" was meant to be that period during which the
asset was in the hands of the individual taxpayer, and "salvage value" to be the
estimated value of the asset at the time of disposition." 37 N.C.L. Rev. 345 (958).
3"The. Company has authorization to amortize for Federal income tax purposes
over a 6o-month period after completion (951-958); approximately $95,ooo,ooo of the
cost of certain electric facilities but in its accounts is providing for depreciation
of such facilities over their estimated service life." 195o Virginia Electric and
Power Company Ann. Rep. 25. (Emphasis added.)
110
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over a long period of time. The legal profession also has a definite
interest in an exact understanding of the techniques of financial re-
porting. Instead of opposing each other, the two professions should
seek a common means for working out this type of an inconsistency
so that courts which are not expertly trained in these matters will not
be called upon to render this type of decision.3 7
JOEL E. KocEN
3In recent years there has been an extensive development in the accounting
profession to narrow accounting principles to a single set of tenets or conventions
so that conflicting reports are not obtainable from the same set of economic facts.
For several years there has been a committee of general practitioners operating
under the auspices of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) ivhich acted as a sounding board for the profession generally. This arrange-
ment did not prove satisfactory because the members of the committee gave off-
hand opinions without extensive research and treated their position as if it were
an extracurricular activity.
On August 27, 1957 Leonard Spacek, managing partner of Arthur Andersen
& Co. delivered an address before the American Accounting Association Conven-
tion held at the University of Wisconsin in which he stressed the need for an
accounting court. "Now I come to the second, and I believe the preferable, way
of eliminating alternative accounting principles-the establishment of a 'court of
accounting principles.'
"To do so the Institute (AIPA) should change its charter to set up a court or
professional tribunal of accounting principles.... I would assume such rules would
be similar to those followed in the Supreme Court of the United States or any
other body where decisions are logically based on briefs and arguments.
"Whether we like it or not, this is what we must accept. Economic results
can be changed by law, but economic facts cannot. Economic results are not our
business, but the reporting of economic facts is our business.
"The court would consist of three persons elected for life with an age limita-
tation.... The members of the court would be [employed] full time and their
salaries would be set by the charter, preferably in relation to those of specific
United States judges so they would automatically change as economic conditions
change." Address by Leonard Spacek. The Need for an Accounting Court, American
Accounting Association 1957 Convention, August 27, 1957.
Since 1957 the machinery for such an accounting court has been moving for-
ward. Once established, a source of authoritative information will be available
for anyone interested, including the judiciary, so that sound accounting will be
more easily harmonized with pressing taxation issues.
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